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The Preliminary Reference Procedure of
the Court of Justice of the European
Communities: A Model for the ICJ?t
By ALICIA FARRELL MILLER*
I. Introduction
While Louis Henkin's now famous observation that "almost all
nations observe almost all principles of international law and almost
all of their obligations almost all of the time,"1 is most likely true, it
is equally true that when nations do not, it undermines both respect
for and future compliance with, international law. In fact, in what is
referred to as the "vicious cycle," the following pattern emerges:
"[t]he more the law is flouted, the more law is instrumentalized to
justify state actions, the less legitimate law and the judicial process
are in the eyes of individuals or governments and the less states and
individuals believe in the sanctity of law or the rule of law."2 In
contrast, in the virtuous cycle, "[t]he more rules are respected by all,
the greater the willingness of citizens and governments to play by
the rules." 3 Thus within the virtuous cycle, compliance with
international law may be sui generis. However, the virtuous cycle
can hardly be said to be the norm.
In its early days, the Court of Justice of the European
Communities (formerly known as the European Court of Justice, or
"ECJ") typified the vicious cycle. However, over the past fifty years,
the ECJ has succeeded in transforming the essentially international
law of treaties into directly applicable law within the domestic
systems of the various member states. Perhaps more importantly,
t Recipient of the Roger J. Traynor Student Writing Award (2009).
* University of California, Hastings College of the Law, J.D. Candidate 2009.
1. Louis HENKIN, How NATIONS BEHAVE 42 (2d ed. 1979).
2. KAREN ALTER, ESTABLISHING THE SUPREMACY OF EUROPEAN LAW 211 (2001).
3. Id. at 218.
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the ECJ has ensured that European law is, in the event of a conflict,
supreme over the national laws of the member states. In fact, "the
transformation of the European legal system has turned the ECJ into
probably the most influential international legal body in existence." 4
This paper will build on the scholarship arguing that the
preliminary reference procedure, the process by which a member
state court may refer questions of community law to the ECJ, was
instrumental in achieving this transformation. Specifically, this
paper will examine what the various member state responses were,
and more importantly, why they ultimately accepted the doctrines
of supremacy and direct effect.
In contrast, the United States Supreme Court has repeatedly
flouted the authority of international tribunals. For example, in the
recent Medellin v. Texas decision, the Supreme Court reaffirmed that
a decision of the International Court of Justice ("ICJ") "does not of
its own force constitute binding federal law that pre-empts state
restrictions on the filing of successive habeas petitions."5 In essence,
the U.S. Supreme Court, which has been described as "the most
extraordinarily powerful court the world has ever known,"6 flouted
the ruling of the ICJ by declaring the decision to be not self-
executing and thus not binding.7 The decision is merely one
example of the fact that the ICJ is not yet operating within the
virtuous cycle. This paper will thus evaluate whether the European
experience can provide a model for increased recognition of the
jurisdiction of the ICJ or other international tribunals by national
courts. Specifically, this paper will address whether the preliminary
reference mechanism of the ECJ may be adopted or incorporated
within the existing ICJ structure.
II. The Development of the European Union
The European Union ("EU") finds its roots in the aftermath of
the Second World War. The Shuman Declaration of May 9, 1950,
4. Id. at 229.
5. 128 S.Ct. 1346, 1367 (2008).
6. LISA CONANT, JUSTICE CONTAINED: LAW AND POLITICS IN THE EUROPEAN
UNION 16 (2002) citing ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH, THE
SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 1 (2d ed. 1986).
7. Admittedly, the Medellin decision involved many complex issues of
federalism, which are not the purpose of this paper; the case is merely used as a
current example of the failed reception of ICJ decisions in US law.
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articulated that "the pooling of coal and steel production should
immediately provide for the setting up of common foundations for
economic development..." and stressed how economic integration
was central to the avoidance of future wars. 8 Thus the "European
Coal and Steel Community" was established 9 along with the first
"version" of the ECJ and preliminary reference.10 In 1958, the Treaty
of Rome" entered into force, thereby establishing the European
Economic Community, now known simply as the European
Community ("EC").12 The Treaty of Rome laid out the basis of the
European legal system, established the ECJ and defined its
jurisdiction, including the preliminary reference procedure.' 3 While
the Treaty of Rome has been amended over the years, the
fundamental jurisdictional parameters remain.
As established by the Treaty of Rome, the ECJ, in addition to
preliminary reference jurisdiction, may hear two types of direct
actions: First, actions brought by the Commission against a member
state for failure to fulfill its treaty obligations,14 and second, actions
brought by either a member state, the European Parliament, the
Council or the Commission for review of acts of community
institutions.15 Institutionally, the ECJ is composed of twenty-seven
justices; one justice per member state.16 The justices, who sit for six-
year terms, must have the qualifications necessary for appointment
to their respective highest national courts.17
Since 1989, the ECJ has been assisted by the Court of First
Instance,18 which is also made up of one justice per member state.19
8. Robert Schuman, Foreign Minister of France, Declaration of May 9, 1950.
9. Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community, April 18, 1952
(expired July 23, 2002).
10. Id. at art. 41.
11. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, March 25,1957.
12. The Treaty of Amsterdam renamed and renumbered the Treaty Establishing
the European Economic Community; all future references shall be to the most
recently published consolidated version: Consolidated Version of the Treaty
Establishing the European Community, November 10, 1997, 1997 O.J. (C 340) 03
[hereinafter EC Treaty].
13. EC Treaty art. 234.
14. Id. at art. 226.
15. Id. at art. 230.
16. Id. at art. 221.
17. Id. at art. 223.
18. Council Decision 88/591 of October 24, 1988, establishing a Court of First
Instance of the European Communities, 1988 O.J. (L319) 1.
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The Court of First Instance may hear cases relating to, inter alia, staff,
contracts and torts, actions brought by individuals (both natural and
corporate), and competition policy cases. 20 Any decision rendered
by the Court of First Instance may be appealed to the Court of
Justice on points of law only.21
III. Preliminary Reference
While the preliminary reference system was established in the
1950s, during the following decade, member states rarely referred
cases to the ECJ.22 In fact, " [t]he refusal of national courts to enforce
European law or refer cases to the ECJ discouraged would-be
litigants. Lacking cases, the ECJ was unable to develop
jurisprudence, and the lack of ECJ jurisprudence left states
significant latitude to interpret European law on their own."23
However, in later years, the preliminary reference procedure
became one of, if not the most, effective tool for increasing the
legitimacy of the ECJ. Before turning to how this came about, a few
words on what a preliminary reference is are in order.
A. Overview
Simply put, the preliminary reference procedure is the process
by which national courts may refer questions of community law to
the ECJ. Article 234 of the EC Treaty, which lays out the basis of this
type of jurisdiction, states:
The Court of Justice shall have jurisdiction to give preliminary
rulings concerning:
(a) the interpretation of this treaty;
(b) the validity and interpretation of acts of the institutions of the
Community and of the ECB [European Central Bank];
(c) the interpretation of the statutes of bodies established by an
act of the Council, where those statutes so provide.
Where such a question is raised before any court or tribunal of
a Member State, that court or tribunal may, if it considers that a
19. EC Treaty at art. 224.
20. Id. at art. 225.
21. Id.
22. Compare the 75 references in the period 1960-1969 to the 2,161 references in
the period 1990-1999. ALTER, supra note 2, at 15.
23. ALTER, supra note 2, at 215.
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decision on the question is necessary to enable it to give
judgment, request the Court of Justice to give a ruling thereon.
Where any such question is raised in a case pending before a
court or tribunal of a Member State against whose decision there
is no judicial remedy under national law, that court or tribunal
shall bring the matter before the Court of Justice.
Member state courts are given wide discretion with respect to
the initial determination of whether to make a reference, and also
"may withdraw its request for a ruling at any time before the ruling
is given."24 The request of the national court is the preliminary
reference, while the answer of the ECJ is the preliminary ruling.
Despite the fact that it is termed a preliminary ruling, the answer is
final and binding upon the member state court that made the
reference. 25 However, the ruling is specifically not an exercise of
appellate jurisdiction. Rather, the proceeding in the member state is
stayed until the ECJ has provided its ruling. In fact, the relationship
between the domestic courts and the ECJ has been described by the
ECJ itself as co-operative rather than hierarchical. 26
B. Who May Refer?
Under article 234 of the EC Treaty, "any court or tribunal of a
Member State" may make a reference to the ECJ. It is worth noting
that unlike appeals to the U.S. Supreme Court, in the EU, courts of
first instance as well as appellate courts may both make references.
In addition, a "court or tribunal" is understood as a unitary phrase
rather than the typical English understanding of the phrase as: "if
not court perhaps then tribunal," and thus generally encompasses a
wide class of adjudicatory bodies.27 In making the determination of
whether a body is a "court" or a "tribunal," Community law, not
national law, applies and the ECJ considers whether the body: (1) is
established by law; (2) is permanent; (3) is independent; (4) has
compulsory jurisdiction; (5) applies rules of law; and (6) is called
upon to give judgment in proceedings intended to lead to a decision
of a judicial nature. 28 Generally, these criteria are applied such that
24. DAVID W. K. ANDERSON & MARIE DEMETRIOU, REFERENCES TO THE EUROPEAN
COURT 2 (2d ed. 2002).
25. Id.
26. Case 244/80, Foglia v. Novello (2), 1981 E.C.R. 3045, 3062.
27. ANDERSON & DEMETRIOU, supra note 24, at 31.
28. Id. at 32-36, (citing Case C-54/96, Dorsch Consult, 1997 E.C.R. 1-4961).
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statutory tribunals are allowed to refer, but government bodies (i.e.,
administrative agencies) and arbitral tribunals are not.29
C. Jurisdiction
There are three classes of jurisdiction under Article 234:
mandatory, discretionary, and impermissible. A member state must
refer a case in two limited circumstances. First, if the court is one
against whose decisions there is no remedy under national law, it is
not only entitled, but moreover it is obligated, to make a
preliminary reference when an issue of Community law is raised in
a case pending before it. This obligation is grounded in the EC
Treaty and has been explained by the ECJ as an obligation based on
cooperation that seeks to ensure uniformity.30  The second
circumstance is when the validity of a Community act is challenged
and the court seeks to invalidate the act. In that situation, there is
no mandatory reference as such, but rather a restriction upon the
national court: "where the validity of a Community act is challenged
before a national court the power to declare the act invalid must...
be reserved to the Court of Justice." 31 Thus, the only way to
invalidate a Community act is to refer the question to the ECJ. The
national court may, however, declare the act to be valid without
reference. 32
The great majority of cases are discretionary. In order for the
ECJ to be able to hear the case, four requirements must be satisfied.
First, the question must relate to provisions of Community Law
upon which the European Court has jurisdiction to give a ruling as
laid out in Article 234.33 Second, the question must relate to the
interpretation or validity of those provisions.34 Third, the question
must have been "raised" before the national court or tribunal.
Finally, the decision on the question must be necessary for the
29. See, e.g., ANDERSON & DEMETRIOU, supra note 24, at 37-46.
30. Case C-393/98, Ministerio Publico and Antonia Gomes Valente, 2001 E.C.R
1-1327.
31. Case 314/85, Foto-Frost v. Hauptzollant Ltibeck-Ost, 1987 E.C.R. 4199, 4231.
32. ANDERSON & DEMETRIOU, supra note 24, at 149.
33. Article 234 jurisdiction covers: (1) the interpretation of the treaties; (2) the
validity and interpretation of acts of community institutions; and (3) the
interpretation of statutes of bodies established by the council, where those statutes
so provide. For a detailed discussion of how these provisions have been
interpreted by the ECJ see ANDERSON & DEMETRIOU, supra note 24, at 57-74.
34. See ANDERSON & DEMETRIOU, supra note 24, at 75-86.
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national court or tribunal to give judgment.35
Lastly, there is the category of impermissible references in
which the ECJ refuses jurisdiction. These occur relatively rarely,
and have neither consistent application nor justification.36 The most
prominent justifications have included: (1) the referring body lacks
the power to refer; (2) the question does not concern community
law; (3) the questions are irrelevant; (4) the main proceedings have
settled; (5) there is no real dispute; and (6) the statement of facts or
national law is inadequate.37 While these and other more stringent
docket control procedures have been discussed, none have formally
been adopted. In fact, the most notable reform to date is the transfer
of certain jurisdiction from the ECJ to the Court of First Instance, so
that more rather than fewer cases could be heard.
D. Effects of Ruling
Two general questions are still developing in the EU regarding
the effects of a ruling: (1) to what extent are the decisions binding,
and (2) whether the decisions have retroactive effect. While this is
not an entirely settled area of law, the ECJ has provided some
guidance. Turning to the latter question first, interpretive
preliminary rulings are effective ex tunc, or in other words, from the
effective date of the provision, not the date of the ruling.38 For
validity references, the answer is not as clear, but for the most part
the ruling is considered to be effective ex nunc, i.e. from the date of
the ruling.39
Turning now to the former question, that of effect, the
"preliminary rulings of the European Court have binding force, or
something approaching it, in relation to all courts of the European
Union (though not the European Court itself)." 40 What does this
mean in relation to the ECJ, the referring court and other national
courts? In contrast to the doctrine of stare decisis found in common
law systems, the rulings of the ECJ do not have binding precedential
effect on the ECJ itself. However, the ECJ often follows its prior
35. Id. at 86-97.
36. Id. at 104.
37. Id. at 104-29.
38. See, e.g., Case 61/79, Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v. Denkavit
Italiana, 1980 E.C.R. 1205, 1223.
39. ANDERSON & DEMETRIOU, supra note 24, at 347-50.
40. Id. at 323.
2009]
Hastings Intl & Comp. L. Rev.
decisions and relies on them to justify a particular outcome in a
specific case.
As to the effect on the referring court, preliminary rulings are
"binding on the national court hearing the case in which the ruling
is given."41 This tenet has rarely been challenged and is binding in
the sense that the national court, or any other court subsequently
hearing the same action, may not contravene the interpretation of
community law given by the ECJ.42 Willingness to refer would seem
to be consent to the jurisdiction of the ECJ and thus indicates a
willingness to obey. However, national courts have rebelled in a
few instances. First and most importantly, substantive conflicts
between Community law and national constitutions are often
supremacy challenges and will be discussed below. Second, if the
ECJ has exceeded its jurisdiction, (i.e., pronounced on matters not
specifically in the preliminary reference) national courts may resist
the ruling.43 If the preliminary reference is viewed as consent by the
national courts to the jurisdiction of the ECJ, then national courts are
bound only on the question referred. Finally, national courts may
seek to avoid the ruling by declaring it irrelevant to the case or
interpreting the ruling itself in a different way than intended by the
ECJ.44 However, in the overwhelming majority of cases, the
referring courts comply.
The more interesting and debatable issue is whether non-
referring courts are bound. Generally, non-referring national courts
may either choose to follow the ruling or make another preliminary
reference to the ECJ, but they are not allowed to simply disregard a
preliminary ruling.45 With respect to rulings on the invalidity of a
41. Case 29/68, Milch-, Fett- und Eierkontor GmbH v. Hauptzollamt
Saarbrticken, 1969 E.C.R. 165, 180.
42. ANDERSON & DEMETRIOU, supra note 24, at 326.
43. This arose in the Roquette case referred by the French courts; a community
regulation was challenged, and the French courts made a reference about the
validity of the regulations. The ECJ ruled the regulations were invalid, but further
declared the invalidity did not affect payments made under the regulations prior to
the ruling. There was a split in the French judiciary, with some French courts
refusing to adhere to the temporal aspect of the ruling. In a subsequent reference,
however, the Court specifically had the opportunity to rule on the temporality
question and again ruled in the negative; this time the French courts adhered. See
ANDERSON & DEMETRIOU, supra note 24, at 328-29.
44. For an example of this in relation to a Greek reference see ANDERSON &
DEMETRIOU, supra note 24, at 330.
45. George Tridimas & Takis Tridimas, National Courts and the European Court of
[Vol. 32:2
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community act, the ECJ has stated that national courts may, and in
fact must, treat the community act as void, without being subject to
the standard obligation to refer.46 With respect to rulings on
interpretation, the case law is not as clear, but the practice of the ECJ
has been to treat prior rulings as binding on other national courts.
For example, it may dismiss an action if it is identical to one
previously ruled upon.47 Thus, in sum, the referring court is strictly
bound, other national courts are loosely bound, and while the ECJ is
not bound, it typically follows its own case law.
IV. Direct Effect and Supremacy
The doctrines of direct effect and the supremacy of European
law, and more importantly their acceptance by the member states,
"created key links which changed member states' strategic
calculations, increasing national governments' incentives and
willingness to bring national policy into accordance with European
law."48 These doctrines arose out of preliminary reference cases. In
fact, the preliminary reference procedure has been the most
important tool that the ECJ has employed to establish its legitimacy
and change the face of European law.49 As stated so eloquently by
Mancini and Keeling:
If the doctrines of direct effect and supremacy are.., the "twin
pillars of the Community's legal system," the reference procedure
laid down in Article 177 [now Article 234] must surely be the
Justice: A Public Choice Analysis of the Preliminary Reference Procedure, 24 INT'L REV. L.
& ECON. 125,129 (2004).
46. Case 66/80, SpA International Chemical Corporation v. Amministrazione
delle Finanze dello Stato, 1981 E.C.R 1191, 1215.
47. Joined Cases 28-30/62, Da Costa v. Nederlandse Belastingadminstratie, 1963
E.C.R. 61 (ECJ ruled that if a referred case did not raise some new factor or
argument, the existence of an earlier ruling will dispose of the case); Case 283/81,
Sri CILFIT & Lamnificio di Gavardo SpA v. Ministry of Health, 1982 E.C.R. 3415
(ECJ ruled that "where previous decisions of the Court have already dealt with the
point of law in question, irrespective of the nature of the proceedings which led to
those Decisions, [and] even though the questions at issue are not strictly identical,"
national courts may rely on them). See also ANDERSON & DEMETRIOU, supra note 24,
at 336.
48. ALTER, supra note 2, at 218.
49. Paul Craig, The Jurisdiction of the Community Courts Reconsidered, 36 TEX.
INT'L L.J. 555, 560 (2001). See also, ALTER, supra note 2, at 230 ("It is hard to
underestimate how much the preliminary ruling mechanism has mattered in
developing the ECJ's web of legal precedent, building legitimacy and support for
the ECJ, and creating a national source of pressure to comply with European law.").
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keystone in the edifice; without it the roof would collapse and the
two pillars would be left as a desolate ruin, evocative of the
temple at Cape Sounion - beautiful but not of much practical
utility.50
The preliminary reference is more than mere procedure, it has
also been used to justify the doctrine of direct effect and
"nationalize" the supremacy of community law.5' In order to fully
grasp the importance of the preliminary reference, the doctrines
themselves and why member states have accepted them must be
examined.
A. Direct Effect
The term "direct effect" does not appear anywhere in the
treaties, but is a crucial concept in EU law. Simply put, it means that
individuals in member state courts may directly rely upon a
provision of EU law. This doctrine finds its roots in the seminal
decision by the European Court of Justice in 1963 in the case of Van
Gend En Loos.52 That case arose from a preliminary reference from a
Dutch trade tribunal, which asked the ECJ if the relevant article of
the Treaty of Rome was self-executing.53 The ECJ, citing the general
scheme and spirit of the Treaty, as well as the fact that preliminary
reference was designed for the use of private nationals, ruled in the
affirmative and declared that:
[T]he Community constitutes a new legal order of international
law for the benefit of which the states have limited their sovereign
rights, albeit within limited fields, and the subject of which
comprise not only Member States but also their nationals.
Independent of the legislation of Member States, Community law
therefore not only imposes obligations on individuals but is also
intended to confer upon them rights which become part of their
legal heritage. 54
Thus, the doctrine of direct effect was established. The Van
Gend en Loos decision effectively meant that private litigants have
50. G. Federico Mancini & David T. Keeling, From CILFIT to ERT: The
Constitutional Challenge Facing the European Court, 11 Y.B. EUR. L. 1, 2-3 (1991).
51. Craig, supra note 49, at 560.
52. Case 26/62, Van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie Belastingen,
1963 E.C.R. 1.
53. ALTER, supra note 2, at 17-18. Similar to the United States, treaties are only
supreme over national laws if they are self-executing.
54. Van Gend en Loos, 1963 E.C.R. at 12.
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legal standing to demand that their governments comply with their
international obligations.55 Direct effect did not automatically apply
to all Treaty provisions, as the ECJ has expanded individual rights
on an ad-hoc basis. 56
B. Supremacy Doctrine
Like direct effect, there is no express basis in the treaties for the
supremacy doctrine. It was announced by the ECJ only one year
after Van Gend in the case of Costa v. ENEL.57 In a certain sense, it
logically flows from the doctrine of direct effect. Specifically, if
individual rights are to have any meaning, European law must be
supreme over national law. In the Costa case, the preliminary
reference came from an Italian small claims court. After Costa
refused to pay an approximately three-dollar electricity bill and
challenged the 1962 nationalization of the electricity companies, the
court sent preliminary references to both the ECJ and the Italian
Constitutional Court.58 The Italian Constitutional Court held the
nationalization to be valid, declared the reference to the ECJ to be
improper, and denied the supremacy of European law.59 The ECJ in
response ruled that European law was supreme, stating that the
"force of Community law cannot vary from one State to another in
deference to subsequent domestic laws, without jeopardizing the
attainment of the objectives of the Treaty .... 60 Therefore, if the
Italian nationalization had been in violation, it would have been
illegal, but the ECJ ruled that the Italian nationalization act did not
in fact violate European law.61 No change in policy in Italy was
required. Thus, the Italian government had nothing to respond to,
and its lack of response became an implicit acceptance of the key
55. ALTER, supra note 2, at 18.
56. Id. For example, the ECJ has ruled that Council-issued regulations and
directives can have direct effect. Lenore Jones, Chapter Nine: Opinions of the Court of
the European Union in National Courts, in INTERNATIONAL LAW DECISIONS IN NATIONAL
COURTS 221, 231-32 (Thomas M. Franck & Gregory H. Fox eds., 1996), citing Case
106/77, Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v. Simmenthal S.p.A., 1 E.C.R.
629, 633-34 (1972).
57. Case 6/64, Flaminio Costa v. Ente Nazionale Per L'Energia Elettrica (ENEL)
1964 E.C.R. 585.
58. ALTER, supra note 2, at 19.
59. Id.
60. Flaminio Costa, 1964 E.C.R. at 585.
61. ALTER, supra note 2, at 19.
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holding of the case. In this way, the supremacy doctrine was
established.62
V. Member States: Judicial and Political Reactions
These two doctrines, taken together, represent a significant
change in the nature of the obligations of the treaties. The effect is to
allow private litigants access to European law in national courts,
and thus increase the number of cases the ECJ may hear. This
increase allows the ECJ "more opportunities to influence national
policy and the process of legal integration itself, and [make] ECJ
decisions enforceable." 63 Perhaps surprisingly, most national courts
accepted the doctrine of direct effect with very little resistance. In
Belgium 64 and the United Kingdom, 65 the courts easily granted the
ECJ the jurisdiction to rule on what treaty provisions created direct
effect. The only major issue was whether directives had direct
effect; most courts now agree that while directives do not have
horizontal effect, they do have vertical direct effect.66 The same was
true in France, 67 as well as Germany, 68 where direct effect of
European law was tacitly accepted as early as the 1960s. The Italian
Constitutional Court has gone so far as to recognize both the direct
effect of ECJ rulings and directives.69  "The reception of the
62. This doctrine was later stated more explicitly in the ECJ's ruling in the
Simmenthal case in 1978. Case 106/77, Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v.
Simmenthal SpA (II), 1978 E.C.R. 629. In that case the ECJ ruled that "every
national court must. .. apply Community law in its entirety and ... accordingly set
aside any provision of national law which may conflict with it, whether prior or
subsequent to the Community rule." Id. at 664.
63. ALTER, supra note 2, at 21-22.
64. Herv6 Bribosia, Report on Belgium, in THE EUROPEAN COURTS AND NATIONAL
COURTS: DOCTRINE AND JURISPRUDENCE 9-10 (Anne-Marie Slaughter et al. eds., 1998).
65. P. P. Craig, Report on the United Kingdom, in THE EUROPEAN COURTS AND
NATIONAL COURTS: DOCrRINE AND JURISPRUDENCE 204-05 (Anne-Marie Slaughter et
al. eds., 1998).
66. Vertical direct effect means that a directive binds the member state to which
it is addressed. In contrast, horizontal direct effect would mean that a directive
addressed to one member state would bind all member states.
67. ALTER, supra note 2, at 174-5. See also Jens Phitner, Report on France, in THE
EUROPEAN COURTS AND NATIONAL COURTS: DOCTRINE AND JURISPRUDENCE, 41, 45
(Anne-Marie Slaughter et al. eds., 1998).
68. ALTER, supra note 2, at 120-121.
69. P. Ruggeri Laderchi, Report on Italy, in THE EUROPEAN COURTS AND NATIONAL
COURTS: DOCTRINE AND JURISPRUDENCE 147, 166-67 (Anne-Marie Slaughter et al. eds.,
1998).
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European Court's direct effect... doctrine has gone very smoothly
in the Netherlands, without major doctrinal controversies or judicial
hesitations." 70
In contrast, with respect to supremacy, the story was entirely
different. Due to its revolutionary nature, the doctrine was quite
controversial and many member states were very reluctant to accept
it. Ultimately, both direct effect and supremacy have been accepted
in what has been described as the "virtually wholesale
transformation of the unbelieving and uncommitted.. "71 How
and why did this occur? It is not the purpose of this paper to
provide yet another detailed survey of the various member state
reactions,72 but some general comments on why national courts
facilitated the expansion of the ECJ's power and why national
governments accepted this judicial revolution are necessary.
A. Judicial Reactions
While the ECJ declared the doctrines of direct effect and
supremacy, the doctrines would have been little more than hot air if
the national courts would not enforce them. Simply put, "the co-
operation of national courts is a sine qua non for the success of the
preliminary reference procedure and, consequently, the very
development of the Community legal order." 73 In almost all the
member states, while national courts struggled with the doctrine of
supremacy, they have, via 'doctrinal negotiation,' 74 arrived at a
compromise of sorts. Thus by "applying European law supremacy,
national judges made European law enforceable in the national
realm." 75  Several theories have been advanced for why this
occurred.
First, the dominant paradigm for discussing European legal
70. Monica Claes & Bruno de Witte, Report on the Netherlands, in THE EUROPEAN
COURTS AND NATIONAL COURTS: DOCTRINE AND JURISPRUDENCE, 171, 171 (Anne-Marie
Slaughter et al. eds., 1998).
71. Id. at 27.
72. For an extensive discussion of the reactions of Belgium, France, Germany,
Italy, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom see, e.g., Part I: National Reports in
THE EUROPEAN COURT AND NATIONAL COURTS: DOCTRINE AND JURISPRUDENCE (Anne-
Marie Slaughter et al. eds., 1988). See also, ALTER, supra note 2, at 64-181 (discussing
French and German reactions).
73. Tridimas & Tridimas, supra note 45, at 134.
74. ALTER, supra note 2, at 38.
75. Id. at 33.
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integration, legalism, assumes that "legal reasoning is conclusive and
that it alone shapes judicial behaviour ... ."76 While this perhaps
may be true to some degree, when multiple legal interpretations are
possible, this theory does not explain why judges choose one above
any other. It certainly does not explain why justices accepted the
ECJ's declaration that unity was supreme over sovereignty.
Another explanation, neo-realism, posits that national interests shape
the political behavior of judges.77 However, this does not account
for other factors that may influence the judiciary, who in many
countries are somewhat shielded from the political process. Nor
does it explain how acceptance of the supremacy doctrine was in
their respective national interests.
A third explanation, the neo-functionalist theory, argues that
judges are motivated by self-interest and efficiency concerns. In
other words European law was seen as being more interesting and
gave judges power vis-A-vis politicians, as well as enabling judges to
get tough questions off their docket.78 The doctrine of supremacy
strips judges of their independence and power, yet this theory does
not explain why they accepted this outcome. Further, this theory
seems to ignore politics, despite the fact that "the legal process, and
the process of expanding the reach and scope of European law in the
national realm is inherently political."79
A fourth theory, the public choice theory, suggests that often the
76. Id. at 39. See also, Karen Alter, Explaining National Court Acceptance of
European Court Jurisprudence: A Critical Evaluation of Theories of Legal Integration, in
THE EUROPEAN COURT AND NATIONAL COURTS: DOCTRINE AND JURISPRUDENCE 227,
230-34 (Anne-Marie Slaughter et al. eds., 1988) [hereinafter Alter, A Critical
Evaluation].
77. Garrett and Weingast have asserted the ECJ accounted for national interests
in its decision making to garner support, while Volcansek argued that judges
changed their positions due to other governmental shifts. See G. Garrett, The
Politics of Legal Integration in the European Union, 49(1) INT'L ORG. 171, 180 (1995); see
also G. Garrett & B. Weingast, Ideas, Interests and Institutions: Constructing the EC's
Internal Market, in IDEAS AND FOREIGN POLICY 173 a. Goldstein & R. Keohane eds.
1993); and M. Volcansek, The Eurpean Court of Justice: Supranational Policy-Making, in
JUDICIAL POLITICS AND POLICY-MAKING IN WESTERN EUROPE 109, 118-19 (M.
Volcansek ed., 1992); see also, Alter, A Critical Evaluation, supra note 76, at 234-38.
78. ALTER, supra note 2, at 41-42. See also A.M. Burley & W. Mattli, Europe Before
the Court, 47(1) INT'L ORG. 41-76 (1993); J.H.H. Weiler, The Transformation of Europe,
100 YALE L.J. 2403, 2426 (1991); A. Stone Sweet & T. Brunel, The European Court and
National Courts: A Statistical Analysis of Preliminary References, 1961-95, 5(1) J.
EUROPEAN PUB. POLIY 66, 73 (1998); and Alter, A Critical Evaluation, supra note 76, at
238-41.
79. Id. at 44.
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benefits of a preliminary reference outweigh the detriments from a
utility standpoint.8 0 Under this theory, there are two principal
benefits: (1) "judicial empowerment," where lower courts via the
preliminary reference mechanism may influence national policy,
and (2) "reversal protection," such that it is harder to reverse a
decision of a lower court when it is based on an ECJ decision.81
While this theory explains why judges may utilize the preliminary
reference mechanism, it does not explain why they accepted certain
of the results thereof.
A more convincing explanation is that offered by Karen Alter,
who describes the process as a negotiated compromise.82 Under this
theory, three key events occurred: (1) the ECJ accepted that it could
not force national courts to adhere to its views; (2) national
governments had limited tools to intervene in the legal process, and
thus had to accept the limits on their sovereignty; and (3) national
courts were divided, hence the high-courts justices, who are
typically most concerned with ceding power and authority, could
not impose their views on other national judges.83 This compromise
came about by a confluence of factors. First and foremost, "the
central factor facilitating the expansion of EC law through judicial
interpretation is the fact that the European Court sits as an
institution outside the domestic realm, which can be used by
domestic actors... and supranational actors.., to challenge
national and European laws." 84 Domestic actors are able to utilize
the ECJ and European law to achieve policy objectives that they
could not realize within the domestic institutional framework, while
supranational actors use the European legal system to achieve ends
they were unable to sway in the political arena.8 5 While this is true,
it is important to keep in mind that the ECJ is not unbiased and will
typically favor European integration. This bias has drawn criticism
from many sources.86 The high national courts have the most to
lose, and thus have been some of the most vehement critics, but
even they cannot limit European law from entering the national
80. Tridimas & Tridimas, supra note 45, at 134-37.
81. Id. at 135.
82. ALTER, supra note 2, at 38.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 52.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 53-54.
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realm. 87 The genius of the preliminary reference is that each judge
can decide for himself whether or not to make a reference and
typically that decision is not appealed. Higher courts may not
review or reverse the decision to refer despite the fact that they are
bound by the preliminary ruling.88
In addition, other forces pressured national high courts into
accepting, or at least not openly rebelling against, the doctrine of
supremacy. 89 These pressures included, the fact that an increasing
amount of national law was of European origin, the fact that there is
no united opposition among national high courts, and a critical
academic press.90 Unable to actually stop legal integration, the
"national high courts were compelled to accept a significant
compromise regarding the issue of EC law supremacy." 91
However, this compromise is just that, a compromise, and there
are limits to the supremacy of European law. Specifically, "while
the competitive dynamic between courts creates a pressure within
national legal systems to accept ECJ jurisprudence, the ECJ's
dependence on national courts [for references and enforcement]
creates significant limits for it."92 Thus, in one sense, ECJ
jurisprudence and European law is supreme as long as there is not
unified opposition to it, a fact that has led to judicial restraint on the
part of the ECJ and in some instances for the ECJ to reverse itself.93
This account tracks more closely to why the national courts would
have accepted the supremacy doctrine - they did so conditionally
and only as a form of compromise. It was not a wholesale
acceptance of ECJ doctrine, which would have been truly incredible.
Rather, it represents a dynamic balance of power that is far from
settled.
B. Political Reactions
While the above explanation may have addressed why national
courts accepted the supremacy doctrine, it did not address the
political reactions and why national governments were willing to
87. Id. at 55.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 56-58.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 59.
92. Id. at 60.
93. Id. at 61-62.
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allow their judiciary to accept a doctrine that so challenges national
sovereignty. The fact that member states did not desire this can be
inferred from the fact that none of the many amendments to the
Treaty of Rome, including the newly signed Lisbon Treaty,
formalize the supremacy of European law. Yet more importantly,
neither have they explicitly rejected it.
One possible explanation for why national governments did not
initially rebel is that perhaps they did not understand exactly what
was going on. Some scholars have asserted that the law is too
technical and that politicians could not understand the ramifications
of ECJ decisions. 94 Even if we grant politicians a bit more acumen,
positing that they understood the decisions, perhaps they simply
could not politically respond to them. The ECJ made one of its most
sweeping declarations of supremacy in the Costa case but then
found the Italian action had not violated EC law, thereby giving the
politicians nothing to object to. 95 Thus, like the tactic used by Justice
Marshall in Marbury v. Madison,96 a new power was declared but not
exercised. Or perhaps rather than being prevented from objecting,
perhaps they simply did not care to because the decision did not
impact any 'material' concerns. 97 This raises a second potential
explanation: the short time horizons of politicians make them
unlikely to expend resources on a decision that has little material
impact.98  In fact, the ECJ often employed integration by
increments 99 to avoid political uproar. This has also been described
as a gradual introduction, whereby the ECJ announces a doctrine
but does not utilize it, and if there are not too many objections, it
will be strengthened and re-affirmed over the course of later
cases. 00
Yet another reason is that once national courts started enforcing
European law, it raised the stakes of governmental non-compliance.
Non-compliance singles out one state as non-cooperative and the
94. Burley & Mattli, supra note 78, at 72-3.
95. See supra Part W.B. for a discussion of Costa and supremacy.
96. 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
97. ALTER, supra note 2, at 186.
98. Id.
99. Peter L. Lindseth, Democratic Legitimacy and the Administrative Character of
Supranationalism: The Example of the European Community, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 628, 664
(1999).
100. ALTER, supra note 2, at 188, (citing TREVOR HARTLEY, THE FOUNDATIONS OF
EUROPEAN COMMuNITy LAW 78-79 (3d ed. 1988)).
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government becomes an antagonist of the national courts, which is
something they tend to try to avoid. 10' Further, under the "legal
rules of the game," states cannot ignore decisions "nor can they rely
on national law to avoid European obligations ... once a case makes
it to court, judges - not politicians, and not the public - are in the
powerful position of deciding what to do."102 However, once this
transformation had taken place, either with or without political
notice or resistance, why could national governments not reassert
control?
There were three potential avenues that member states pursued
at one time or another: (1) preventing national courts from
recognizing the supremacy doctrine; (2) amending the Treaty of
Rome to limit the mandate of the ECJ; and (3) accepting the
supremacy doctrine but attempting to influence how the ECJ
applied it.103 The first option did not work because in many
countries it was seen as an infringement upon the separation of
powers or an attack on the independence of the judiciary, and
would have engendered political consequences abroad. 104 Likewise,
the second option failed due to the difficulty of amendment, which
requires unanimity and ratification by all the member states.10 5
Finally, the third option, unlike the first two, has not been a
complete failure. 06 This may be due to the fact that the "negotiated
compromise" is still in flux and therefore it is legitimate for national
governments to intervene in the debate. Member states can use
tools of public opinion, be involved in the drafting of new domestic
legislation, and perhaps most importantly, be involved in the
drafting of new treaties. While they cannot reverse what the ECJ
has done, they may be able to shape what the ECJ can do in the
future.
C. The Results of Acceptance
While "the European legal system started out with many of the
101. Tridimas & Tridimas, supra note 45, at 138.
102. ALTER, supra note 2, at 192.
103. Id. at 193.
104. Id. at 193-94.
105. Treaty on European Union (Consolidated Version), 2002 O.J. (C 325) 1,
Article 48; see also, ALTER, supra note 2, at 195-98.
106. ALTER, supra note 2, at 202-07.
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limitations and weakness of most international legal systems," 107 it
was transformed by decisions rendered via the preliminary
reference procedure into a system where the law was followed and
legal decisions respected. When direct effect, which itself was
accepted with little resistance, is taken together with supremacy, the
two doctrines empower litigants in member state courts to raise
European law claims and have their rights vindicated thereunder.
Once this occurred, private litigants raised more and more claims,
and the national courts referred more and more cases.108 Unlike
Medellin, private litigants can rest assured that when a European
claim arises in national courts, an independent and expert
international tribunal will be able to rule on that claim and that that
ruling will actually be enforced within the domestic system. It is
these private litigants that "help to ensure that governments are not
above the law."109  However, the question remains: Can the
European experience translate into other contexts?
VI. Preliminary Reference in the ICJ
The experience of the preliminary reference procedure, while
not without its own hurdles, has shown that national courts and an
international tribunal can cooperate rather than clash. If a
procedure like the preliminary reference could work in other
international fora, perhaps this could avoid discrepancies between
rulings of international tribunals and national courts. If national
courts could turn to an international tribunal that has expertise in a
particular field without surrendering jurisdiction or ceding control
of the case, a climate of cooperation would result, and perhaps,
international rulings would start to carry the force of law.
While potentially the preliminary reference could be
incorporated into any international tribunal's statute, this paper will
address specifically whether it may be adopted within the ICJ. The
ICJ and the ECJ "are both courts born of war, established by
interstate treaties" with the stated purpose of helping to avoid
future wars.110  Neither had centralized judicial enforcement
107. Id. at 209.
108. Id. at 218.
109. Id. at 219.
110. Rosalyn Higgins, The ICJ, the ECJ and the Integrity of International Law, 52
INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 1,1 (2003).
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mechanisms,'11 and initially, neither heard many cases. However,
while the ECJ's position rapidly changed primarily due to the
preliminary reference procedure, the ICJ's decisions are still being
flouted. In order to determine if a preliminary reference like
procedure can work in the ICJ, two questions must be addressed: (1)
is it procedurally possible; and (2) will it be practically effective?
A. Procedurally, Can it Work?
There is no reason why it could not work, especially as the
groundwork is already laid. The ICJ may issue "advisory
opinions." 112 Article 65 of the ICJ statute reads, "[tihe Court may
give an advisory opinion on any legal question at the request of
whatever body may be authorized by or in accordance with the
Charter of the United Nations to make such a request."" 3 Thus,
there is a procedure by which the ICJ may give advisory opinions
and has done so a number of times in the past.
However, there are two difficulties with the advisory opinion
procedure. First and foremost, the bodies which are authorized to
request an advisory opinion are very limited.114  The second
difficulty is that currently most advisory opinions are not binding.
As stated by the ICJ itself, "[c]ontrary to judgments, and except in
rare cases where it is stipulated beforehand that they shall have
111. Due to the Treaty on European Union, which contained an amendment to
EC Treaty article 51, since 1993 the ECJ has had the power to impose fines for non-
compliance with a decision.
112. Statute of the International Court of Justice, Arts. 65-68, available at
http://www.icj-cij.org/documents/index.php?pl=4&p 2 =2 &p3 =0 (last visited
January 28, 2009) [hereinafter, ICJ Statute].
113. Id.
114. Those bodies are: General Assembly, Security Council, Economic and Social
Council, Trusteeship Council, Interim Committee of the General Assembly,
International Labour Organization (ILO), Food and Agriculture Organization of the
United Nations (FAO), United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural
Organization (UNESCO), World Health Organization (WHO), International Bank
for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), International Finance Corporation
(IFC), International Development Association (IDA), International Monetary Fund
(IMF), International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), International Tele-
communication Union (ITU), International Fund for Agricultural Development
(IFAD), World Meteorological Organization (WMO), International Maritime
Organization (IMO), World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), United
Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO), International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA). International Court of Justice, Organs and Agencies of the
United Nations Authorized to Request Advisory Opinions, available at http://www.icj-
cij.org/jurisdiction/index.php?pl=5&p2=2&p3=1 (last visited May 8, 2008).
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binding effect.., the Court's advisory opinions have no binding
effect. The requesting organ, agency or organization remains free to
decide, by any means open to it, what effect to give to these
opinions." 115 Thus, under the current structure, advisory opinions
are generally not binding even upon those agencies authorized to
request them.
These two difficulties in the current structure are not fatal. The
General Assembly of the United Nations may authorize other bodies
who "may also request advisory opinions of the Court on legal
questions arising within the scope of their activities." 116 Thus courts
of the member states of the UN may be so authorized. Not the
states themselves, but rather their judicial branches. This would
preserve the independence of the judiciary and ensure the advisory
opinion requests were relevant, or borrowing from the preliminary
reference language, necessary for an opinion in a case pending
before them. With respect to the second problem, that of the
binding effect of advisory opinions, there is no reason why, as a
condition to authorizing the national courts to refer, the United
Nations could not require the member states to "stipulate
beforehand" that the opinions would have binding effect. This
stipulation has been made in the past, for example in the
Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United
Nations," 7 in the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of
the specialized agencies of the United Nations," 8 and in the
Headquarters Agreement between the United Nations and the
United States of America." 9 Hence, there is no apparent reason why
this stipulation could not be made again in the context of advisory
opinions.
Like preliminary references in the European system, advisory
opinions could thus be binding on the point of law referred, but
would not decide the merits of the case nor strip the national court
of jurisdiction. While the exact form this system would take would
necessarily be influenced by the political negotiations required to
implement it, prima facie there is no reason why it could not occur.
115. International Court of Justice, Advisory Jurisdiction, http://www.icj-
cij.org/jurisdiction/index.php?pl=5&p2=2 (last visited May 8, 2008).
116. U.N. Charter, art. 96, para. 2.
117. Art. VIII, § 30, Feb. 13, 1946, 21 U.S.T. 1418, 1 U.N.T.S. 15.
118. Art. VIII, § 21(b), June 26, 1947, 61 Stat. 3416, 11 U.N.T.S. 11.
119. Art. VIII, § 21(b), June 26, 1947, 61 Stat. 3416, 11 U.N.T.S. 11.
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As long as the two basic conditions are met, namely allowing
national courts to request advisory opinions that would then bind
them on the question referred, a system comparable to the
preliminary reference mechanism could be effected.
B. Practically, Would it Work?
While in theory adapting the preliminary reference system to
the ICJ structure is possible, would it be effective in practice? This is
an open question for debate. Rosalyn Higgins, a judge at the ICJ
thinks not.120 In her words, Article 234 would not provide an
answer because "it is simply cumbersome and unrealistic to
suppose that other tribunals would wish to refer points of general
international law to the International Court of Justice." 121 However,
two prior presidents of the ICJ have disagreed.
In 1999, then President of the ICJ, Stephen Schwebel, stated, in
his yearly report to the General Assembly, that "in order to
minimize such possibility as may occur of significant conflicting
interpretations of international law, there might be virtue in
enabling other international tribunals to request advisory opinions
of the International Court of Justice on issues of international law
that arise in cases before those tribunals .... .,122 This sentiment was
echoed the following year by then President of the ICJ, Gilbert
Guillaume, in his address to the General Assembly. While
recognizing that the political will to have the ICJ act as an appellate
body was not present, Guillaume suggested that "in order to reduce
the risk of differing interpretations of international law, would it not
be appropriate to encourage the various courts to seek advisory
opinions in some cases from the International Court of Justice?" 123
He then continued, the General Assembly "could, by means of an
appropriate resolution, urge not only the courts it has established
but also those outside the United Nations system, to turn to the
Court through the General Assembly." 124  Thus, he not only
suggested the use of advisory opinions, but in fact recommended a
120. Higgins, supra note 110, at 20.
121. Id.
122. U.N. GAOR, 54th Sess., 39th plen. mtg. at 3-4, U.N. Doc. A/54/PV.39 (Oct.
26, 1999).
123. U.N. GAOR, 55th Sess., 41st plen. mtg. at 7, U.N. Doc. A/55/PV.41 (Oct. 26,
2000).
124. Id.
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procedure therefore: namely, that the General Assembly could
sanction national courts to so request advisory opinions. It is
encouraging that two past presidents of the ICJ believe that the use
of advisory opinions on a larger scale is not only feasible but
desirable.
Turning back to Judge Higgins' objection, she provided no basis
for her assertion that it would be "cumbersome or unrealistic" to
suppose that other tribunals would want to refer. If the system
remains an advisory system, limited in scope to the questions
referred, there is no danger for national courts that their jurisdiction
would be infringed or their control over the final decision on the
merits would be impinged. Like the preliminary reference system
in the ECJ, advisory opinions would be limited to those areas over
which the ICJ has jurisdiction, for example, treaties in which direct
actions in the ICJ are permitted. Requests for advisory opinions
could be for the most part discretionary, as in the European system.
The only instances of mandatory referrals could be, for example,
from courts from which there is no further recourse or in cases that
involved the rights of other nations or nationals of other countries.
If, like their counter parts in the European system, lower courts
could make references, the likelihood of referral would be even
greater. Thus, the scope of ICJ review would be limited, and there
would be a great degree of discretion for a large number of courts.
In this way, domestic courts could, as many national courts in
the EU have done, refer with confidence knowing that as long as
their final decision does not contravene the interpretation given by
the ICJ, it would likely not be challenged. Rather than member
states bringing direct actions against each other in the ICJ, when an
issue of international import arises, an advisory opinion could
answer such issues directly in the primary case and avoid the
potential for concurrent and potentially conflicting proceedings.
Like the ECJ, the ICJ would sit as a third party arbiter, outside the
domestic systems of the member courts. While like the ECJ, the ICJ
may be slightly biased, that does not change the fact that domestic
courts and litigants could use the advisory opinion procedure to
challenge or put pressure on other branches to change domestic
policies.
That being said, the ICJ would not initially be armed with the
tools of direct effect and supremacy. However, neither was the ECJ.
Perhaps these specific tools would not be as appropriate on the
international stage. However, by having an advisory opinion
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procedure open to national courts, the ICJ could start to develop a
doctrinal framework that would be more effective than the current
system. It would open up a cooperative relationship or at least
negotiation between national courts and the ICJ that would not be
appellate or contentious in nature. In this way, these courts could
interact. Once judicial interaction occurs, there is a greater
likelihood that the jurisdiction and rulings of the international court
will be recognized and given weight in the national courts, as was
seen in the European system. Rather than jealously guard their
judicial domains, the advisory opinion system, like the preliminary
reference procedure, would allow justices to work to ensure
domestic laws are not in direct conflict with international law.
VII. Conclusion
In order for the advisory opinion system of the ICJ to be
available to national courts, there needs to be the political will in the
General Assembly to make it so. Thus, while this procedure is
procedurally and practically feasible, it will take the political
branches to implement it. There is little that the law can do unless
and until it is facilitated by the political actors.
That being said, there is much we can learn from the European
experience. Perhaps the political will to reinvent the system in the
ICJ will never be present. However, the advisory
opinion/preliminary reference system could and should be
incorporated into future adjudicatory regimes. The European
experience may not be able to fix the current system, but it clearly
can provide a model for future systems. As regional agreements,
free trade areas, and customs unions become more and more
prevalent, regional courts will continue to be established and any
one of these could incorporate a procedure such as the preliminary
reference. This would create judicial interaction, dialogue and
negotiation at least within limited spheres.
[Vol. 32:2
